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Abstract 
This paper reviews the current position, recent research and 
potential future areas of research relating to road track costs, 
with particular reference to Heavy Goods Vehicles. It opens with 
a theoretical discussion, which concludes that the appropriate 
basis for changing is long run marginal social cost, but casts 
some doubt on whether the existing cost allocation procedure 
achieves this. The main reason for this is the likelihood that 
the marginal capital cost per unit of traffic of coping with an 
increase in traffic volumes greatly exceeds the average capital 
cost per unit of traffic at the present time. 
The DTp method of allocating track costs is then outlined, and 
the sensitivity of the results to variations in a number of the 
key assumptions is tested. 
The results show that the DTp method may only be allocating HGVfs 
as little as half of their costs. Hence instead of covering 
their allocated costs by some 30% to allow for environmental 
effects, as the DTp. claim, it may be that these lorries are only 
meeting 65% of their allocated cost. 
The sensitivity tests that yield the above results reflect the 
following concerns: 
(1) FUEL CONSUMPTION 
DTp measures lorry mileage and deduces fuel used and hence 
fuel tax paid. However, their fuel consumption figures look 
implausibly high. We have used FTA figures instead. 
(2) TRAFFIC FLOW 
DTp currently allocate many costs to vehicle kilometres 
(e.g. drainage, winter maintenance, traffic signs etc.), but 
accepts that the demand for a new road arises in proportion 
to PCUs (passenger car units), i.e. giving more weight to 
lorries. Our view is that once a road is opened any general 
costs involved in its continued use should also be allocated 
by PCUs. 
(3) LORRY WEIGHTS 
DTp use lorry weights as reported on a self completion 
questionnaire, which naturally omit any overloading. We 
have used observed values from a large study in Cheshire. 
(4) CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 
.-. .. 
- 
DTp charge only what is currently being spent. Following 
cutbacks in all government expenditure, this amount is now 
some 50% lower than in the early 1970s. Since capital 
expenditure was roughly 60% of total road expenditure, this 
implies that cost allocations have fallen by 30% on this 
account. Our view is that even this understates the true 
long run marginal cost of road traffic. 
Although the precise figures are subject to much doubt, in every 
case there seems good reason to suppose that the proposition is 
broadly correct. Taken cumulatively, they would be sufficient to 
convert the existing overpayment by HGVs (which presumably is 
intended to reflect unquantified environmental costs) into a 
substantial underpayment. If the increase in road haulage 
taxation which these figures would imply is politically 
unacceptable, then there is a good case for corresponding action 
to relieve the rail and water modes of part of their 
infrastructure costs. 
1. Introduction 
1.1.1 The purpose of this study is to review the current 
position, recent research and potential future areas of research 
relating to Road Track Costs, with particular reference to Heavy 
Goods Vehicles (HGVts). 
1.1.2 From the DTpt s "The allocation of road track coststt 
(Dept. of Transport, Annual) it is clear that DTp8s position is 
that lorries more than cover their allocated costs, 
Annual and that the 'margint to cover non-allocated costs (such 
as environmental costs) is sufficient to fulfill the 
recommendations of the Armitage Committee. 
1.1.3 In this report we first consider the reasons why the 
level of road haulage taxation might be a matter of concern. In 
section 3 we discuss the principles on which an efficient road 
haulage taxation regime would be based, whilst section 4 
discusses some of the practical problems in measuring the 
relevant concepts. Section 5 goes through existing D.Tp. 
practice. In Section 6, we present some evidence on the question 
of whether existing levels of road spending are appropriate as a 
basis for computing long run marginal cost. Section 7 presents 
the results of a number of sensitivity tests of changes in 
allocation procedures whilst sections 8, 9 and 10 look in turn at 
vehicle delay, accidents and environmental costs. Finally, we 
present our conclusions in section 11. 
2. The Im~ortance of Road Haulase Taxation 
2.11 There are two issues involved in deciding the appropriate 
charges to make for use of the road system. These are the equity 
issue, and the issue of efficiency. Regarding equity, in a 
competitive industry such as road haulage, there seems little 
doubt that in the long run any change in road haulage taxation is 
passed on to customers, and ultimately to consumers of the 
products carried by the industry at large. It is generally 
believed that the price elasticity of demand for road haulage as 
a whole is low, so that the effects on the industry itself of a 
tax increase will be slight. According to the F.T.A. cost 
tables, taxation forms some 20% of the cost of operating a 
maximum weight HGV. (We believe that the reason some other 
tables give a lower proportion is that they overstate certain 
elements of overhead costs.) We believe that the finding of 
Edwards (1970) that freight transport typically constitutes some 
10% of the final price of goods, is still valid. Thus, for 
instance, a 20% increase in road haulage taxation would lead to a 
0.4% rise in the price level in general. Even this would be 
offset by the fact that the extra revenue accruing to the 
government would permit an offsetting tax reduction elsewhere. 
Thus we believe that it is appropriate to concentrate on 
efficiency issues when examining road haulage taxation, although 
we acknowledge that in political terms equity arguments may be 
influential. 
2.1.2 Now it may be thought that, if the demand for road haulage 
is very price-inelastic, then the level of taxation is n6t very 
important in efficiency terms either. Whatever the level of 
taxation, the level of activity of the road haulage industry will 
be very similar. However, this viewpoint ignores a number of 
important factors. 
2.1.3 Probably the most important is that the structure of road 
haulage taxation influences the type of vehicle used for certain 
kinds of work, and that different vehicle types have different 
implications, both for road maintenance costs and for social 
costs such as congestion and environmental intrusion. At the 
margin, the level of road haulage taxation might also influence 
decisions such as the number and location of depots, and thus the 
miles run by different types of vehicle on the road system. 
However, it is the issue of mode choice which has commanded the 
greatest debate. 
2.1.4 It is generally accepted that a substantial proportion of 
road haulage consists of work that could not in any likely 
circumstances be undertaken by another mode. Rail - and, where 
they are available, water or pipeline transport - is only 
potentially competitive for traffic with certain characteristics, 
such as large flows of bulk materials and/or long lengths of 
haul. 
2.1.5 How much of the current road haulage market satisfies 
these considerations is not known with any precision, although 
this is an issue we intend to investigate in the course of a 
major SERC funded project on freight mode split (Fowkes et all 
1987). It is worth noting however that of the 99 billion tonne- 
kilometres of freight transport undertaken by heavy goods 
vehicles in 1985, 75% was undertaken by articulated vehicles or 
rigids of over 25 tonnes gross vehicle weight, 67% was on lengths 
of haul in excess of 100km. and some 42% was of commodities in 
which rail has a significant market share (Dept of Transport 
1986). There is undoubtedly some potential rail traffic amongst 
this large volume of road freight, and at the margin the level of 
road taxation will play a role in influencing the choice of mode. 
2 .l. 6 It is far clearer that a large part of the existing rail 
freight market is subject to the threat of road competition which 
constrains the rail rate that can be secured. A given percentage 
change in the cost of road haulage for this traffic should 
translate fairly directly to an equivalent change in the rail 
revenue that can be secured from the traffic, and thus ultimately 
influence the size and scope of the rail freight business that 
can survive in the long run. It is in this respect that the level 
of road haulage taxation is of most importance to the future of 
British Rail. 
3. The Analvtical Issues Involved 
3 .l. 1 In respect of all the efficiency issues discussed in the 
previous section, the conventional economic argument would be 
that the appropriate level of taxation for a particular vehicle 
should be equal to the marginal cost imposed on the rest of 
society by its use. These costs would include the costs imposed 
on the authority providing the roads, in terms of construction 
and maintenance costs, on--other road users, in terms of delay and 
accidents, and on society at large, in terms of the environmental 
effects of road use. Only then will the vehicle operator or his 
customer correctly assess the costs involved in choice of'mode, 
vehicle type or the amount of freight to transport. 
3.1.2 Having stated this principle, there are a number of 
complications to be considered. Firstly, we have to define the 
time period with respect to which marginal cost is to be defined. 
If we measured marginal cost in the short run - that is to say 
with a fixed stock of roads - then it would obviously exclude all 
capital costs but would include the extra congestion created by 
additional traffic on the existing road system. If we measured 
marginal cost in the long run, we would include the appropriate 
amount of additional capital expenditure justified by the 
additional traffic, but only such extra congestion and 
environmental costs as would still remain when the road system 
had been fully adjusted to the new traffic level. Arguments exist 
in favour of both methods of charging. The short run approach is 
geared to obtaining optimal levels of traffic at a particular 
point in time for whatever road network happens to exist. The 
long run approach has as its aim the achievement of an 
appropriate level of traffic for the new situation which will 
exist when the road system is fully adjusted to any increase in 
volumes. The choice between the two depends on the degree to 
which the sacrifice of an optimal level of utilisation of the 
existing road system will lead to benefits in terms of more 
appropriate levels of traffic in the long run. Short run marginal 
cost pricing is the most appropriate approach when adjustment of 
demand to price is instantaneous whilst capacity adjustment is 
delayed. Long run marginal cost is the appropriate basis for 
pricing when demand is slow to adjust. 
3.1.3 In general, if capacity is being adjusted appropriately to 
demand on a continuous basis then the two approaches should give 
equivalent results. In the British public sector in general, and 
in previous discussions of road taxation in particular, long run 
marginal cost pricing has generally been the favoured choice. \ 
This seems to be particularly appropriate in the case of freight 
transport, where many investment decisions cause customers to 
become locked in to particular distribution patterns for 
substantial periods of time. 
3.1.4 An interesting attempt to estimate short run marginal cost 
for the use of roads is contained in Newbery (1987). However, we 
take issue with him on a number of points. The most serious is 
his treatment of a large proportion of maintenance costs as being 
due to the effect of the weather rather than traffic (see p. 16). 
We regard his derivation of congestion costs from speed-flow 
relationships as understating the delay caused by heavy lorries, 
which delay other vehicles even on uncongested roads. Also, the 
unquantified environmental costs of an increase in traffic are 
likely to be much greater in the short run, with a fixed stock of 
roads, than in the long run when capacity has adjusted to demand. 
For all these reasons, we expect his figures to substantially 
understate the short run marginal social cost of goods vehicles. 
We follow the more conventional approach of seeking to estimate 
long run marginal cost. But it is worth noting that, if capacity 
is optimally adjusted to demand and there are no indivisibilities 
(which is of course an unrealistic assumption in the case of 
each individual road, although looking at the network as a whole 
it may not be too far from the truth) then short run marginal 
cost and long run marginal cost will be equal (Rees, 1976, Ch. 4). 
3.1.5 Whether we seek to measure short run or long run marginal 
cost, we have to recognise that these costs will vary enormously 
according to whereabouts on the system and at what time of day 
the traffic is moving. At some places and times there will be 
spare capacity, no congestion and little environmental intrusion; 
at other places and times the problems caused by traffic growth 
will be severe. The best that can be hoped of a single national 
tax structure is to charge the mean of all these individual 
marginal costs (strictly, on theoretical grounds, the best single 
tariff would be the mean weighted by the derivative of traffic 
volume with respect to price if this is known to vary by time or 
location, Turvey, 1974, Ch. 4). Thus - in the absence of a system 
such as electronic road pricing which can discriminate by time 
and place - road vehicle taxation is a very blunt instrument 
which cannot achieve an appropriate allocation of traffic at the 
level of the individual flow. This means that there is good 
reason in principle to supplement even the appropriate average 
level of road taxation with other measures to influence mode 
choice in particular circumstances, such as planning constraints 
or the Freight Facilities grant. 
3.1.6 A third issue to consider at this stage is the problem of 
the second best. It is well known that demonstrations of the 
optimality of marginal cost pricing depend on its simultaneous 
achievement throughout the economy. Divergences between price and 
marginal cost in some sectors of the economy which cannot be put 
right in general justify divergences elsewhere. This has 
sometimes been taken to mean that, for instance, because 
environmental costs are not charged for throughout other sectors 
of the economy, they should not be charged for in the case of 
freight transport. This is a gross abuse of the theory. It would 
only hold true if all products inflicted equi-proportionate 
environmental costs. In general, second best problems are most 
severe where products have high cross-elasticities of demand. 
This suggests a pragmatic approach is to take account of them 
directly where the products in question are known to be related 
(i.e. either substitute or complements) and to assume that other 
effects are too small to be significant (Turvey, 1971, Ch. 3). 
3.1.7 That would seem to place particular emphasis on the 
relative pricing considerations for different forms of transport. 
In the case of road and rail transport, the pricing regimes 
appear at first sight to be very different. Road transport is 
produced by a large number of firms operating at roughly constant 
returns to scale, and therefore - if the level of taxation is 
appropriate - one would expect its rates to aproximate 
reasonably to long run marginal cost. Railfreight, on the other 
hand, operates on a policy of charging what the market will bear 
subject to a constraint that the set of traffic attracted in this 
way must earn sufficient revenue collectively to cover the 
avoidable costs of the rail freight sector as a whole (including 
a 5% return on assets). 
3.1.8 In fact, this combination of pricing regimes should work 
to achieve a reasonably efflcient allocation of traffic. Rail has 
an incentive to try to attract any traffic that can cover 
marginal cost, since this will improve its financial performance, 
and - in a regime of individually negotiated contracts - will not 
generally reduce its revenue from existing traffic. To the 
extent that it can and does charge a higher rate for specific 
flows without affecting its traffic volumes, this is of no 
allocative significance. If its pricing ceiling is in fact set by 
road haulage rates and these correctly reflect the marginal 
social cost of road haulage, then unless rail can cover all its 
avoidable costs with revenue then the total social costs of 
transport would be reduced by transfering all rail freight to 
road. 
3.1.9 Of course, this argument strictly requires that rail 
management achieves absolutely perfect price discrimination, and 
charges exactly the maximum all freight is willing to bear. It 
also ignores the problem raised above that road haulage taxes at 
best reflect average marginal costs rather than those pertaining 
to any specific flow of traffic. Nevertheless, the argument does 
imply that the existing competitive regime might be a reasonably 
appropriate one provided that road haulage taxes accurately 
reflect the marginal social cost of road use. Two further 
provisos are worth adding. We are assuming that rail does not 
have the incentive and the market power to cross-subsidise 
unprofitable traffics and still achieve its financial targets. 
Thus, whilst traffics will vary in their contributions to 
overheads, every traffic and group of traffics will at least 
cover its avoidable cost. More questionably we are assuming that 
rail itself does not impose any external costs. To the extent 
that this assumption is untrue, these costs should also be 
recovered in the form of taxation. 
3.1.10 From the foregoing it will be appreciated that road user 
charges should reflect long run marginal social costs. We must 
consider the optimal increase in road capital expenditure 
resulting from an extra 'unit1 of road use. Given this capital 
expenditure, how will the additional unit of road use increase 
maintenance costs, environmental costs and costs to other road 
users? The following section looks at some of the principles on 
which we may base our methods of estimating these costs. Section 
5 then looks critically at the existing DTp procedure. 
4. Problems in Measurins Lons Run Marsinal Cavital and 
Maintenance Costs 
4.1 Simvle Model 
4.1.1 In the previous sections we established what it is that we 
are trying to measure. We concluded that we need to know, for a 
given increase in traffic, what on average is the extra capital 
expenditure on the road system that is optimal, and given this 
expenditure what is the additional maintenance and external cost 
still remaining. 
4.1.2 Regarding capital expenditure, there is an immediate 
problem. Capital expenditure is incurred in order to produce a 
stream of output over time, rather than simply to accomodate the 
traffic flow of a particuhr year. Thus it is hard to find any 
justification for a process of attributing this expenditure 
entirely to the traffic of a particular year on a 'pay-as-you-go' 
basis. On the other hand, previous attempts to estimate 
appropriate levels of depreciation and interest to charge on the 
inherited stock of roads have required successions of very 
arbitrary assumptions. In any event, we have no interest in the 
historic cost of the existing stock of roads nor even in its 
replacement value. Provided that we properly assess the costs of 
maintenance and periodic reconstruction, then the existing stock 
of roads will have such a long life that we may, for all 
practical purposes, take that life as being infinite. What we are 
concerned with is the cost of constructing new roads or improving 
existing ones in order to cope with traffic growth. If we do 
indeed regard these roads as having infinite lives, then the 
capital cost per year of this process is simply the interest on 
the additional capital tied up. 
4.1.3 Now, were it true that the existing stock of roads were 
perfectly adjusted to the current volume of traffic and that the 
current level of new investment were perfectly adjusted to the 
rate of traffic growth, then the calculation would be easy. We 
could simply relate the extra annual cost (r times I, where r is 
the rate of interest and I the current level of investment) to 
the growth in traffic (dQ, where Q is the volume of traffic). The 
appropriate charge would then be r.I/dQ per unit of traffic. The 
total revenue raised by this element of the charge would be 
r.I.Q/dQ. With a level of r of .07, and a rate of traffic growth 
of some 3% per annum, it is worth noting that this formula would 
charge users at least 2.33 times the current level of capital 
expenditure as the capital cost of using the road system. 
4.2 Numerical Examnle 
4.2.1 Table 4.1 shows that between 1975 and 1985, total vehicle 
kilometres by all types of vehicles has risen from 209.84 to 
282.81 billion km. This is equivalent to 3.03% growth p.a. 
4.2.2 For the ten financial years 1975/6 to 1984/5 the total 
road capital expenditure is shown in Table 4.2 to be f18071m in 
1986 prices i.e. an average of f1807.lm p.a.. Hence, 1% growth 
in traffic is associated with roughly f600m capital expenditure. 
4.2.3 If there were no growth in traffic we may assume no 
capital expenditure charge for the provision of extra road space. 
Each 1% growth in traffic requires/occasions f600m capital 
expenditure, which with a 7% interest rate is f42m capital 
charge. Looked at in reverse, the removal of any 1% of total 
traffic would avoid the f42m capital charge. Hence each 1% of 
traffic should be charged f42m, making the total 
charge f4200m. This is simply 1800 x 7/3. This confirms the 
theoretical analysis. 
4.3.1 Of course, the assumptions of this simple model do not 
hold good. Road spending is not perfectly related to traffic 
growth. Nevertheless such evidence as exists suggests that - far 
from catching up with backlogs of spending - the current level of 
spending is inadequate to-keep up with current levels of -traffic 
growth. Evidence for this is given in section 6. 
Table 4.1 
Road Traffic. (Thousand million vehicle kilometers). 
Year 
1975 1978 1981 1985 
Rigid 
2 axle 11.28 12.19 11.72 12.82 
3 axle 1.54 1.53 1.18 1.13 
4 axle 0.81 0.93 0.94 0.97 
Artic 
3 axle 1.49 1.05 0.78 0.67 
4 axle . 3.54 - 4.47 4.80 4.10 
5+ axle 0.28 0.23 0.11 1.78 
Total goods 18.84 20.39 19.53 21.48 
vehicles 
Total all 
vehicles 209.84 234.30 251.86 282.81 
Source:- Transport Statistics GB 1975-85, Table 2.1. 
Table 4.2 
Year 
Emenditure on Roads 1968/69 to 1985/86 fat 1986 vricesl 
and Road Traffic 1968 to 1985 
Source: - 
Note : - 
Traffic 
Costs (Em) (Thous. mill. veh km) 
Capital Current Total All motor All 
vehicles HGVts 
Derived from TSGB 1964-74 Table 20 and TSGB 1975-85 
Tables 1.15, 2.1 and 7.4. 
These cost classifications are not the same as used by 
DTp. for the track cost calculations, where 
reconstruction, haunching, resurfacing, surface 
dressing, skid treatments, bridges and remedial 
earthworks are all counted as current, and not as 
capital as in the above table. 
4 .3 .2  It may also be said that additional road spending is not 
solely undertaken with the aim of creating more road capacity. 
Improved journey times and reduced environmental impact are other 
major factors leading to road investment. Yet we must ask why, if 
the road system was previously held to be appropriate to the 
traffic level, views have changed. An element of the reason might 
be that, with rising prosperity, the value put on a unit of 
improvement has increased. But in the majority of cases it seems 
likely that the factor that has led to a road improvement being 
justified where previously it was not is the growth in the volume 
of traffic using the existing system. Of course it is also the 
case that were the extra road spending sufficient to produce 
better conditions in terms of faster journeys and improved 
environment than existed before the traffic growth that justified 
it, then rather than having further external costs to add on, we 
should have to deduct those benefits from the spending which 
brought them about. Undoubtedly this is true for many individual 
schemes when opened. However, for every road that is improved 
(or duplicated), in a given year, there are many more which are 
not, and which consequently with growing traffic levels become 
more congested and environmentally poorer. It is a matter of 
debate whether current levels of road spending are leading to an 
overall improvement in travel times and environmental conditions. 
Whilst conditions may improve where a new road is opened, 
elsewhere traffic growth is leading to a deterioration which may 
well outweigh that improvement. We return to this issue in the 
next section. 
4 . 3 . 3  Thus, in the absence of any evidence that the conditions 
on our roads are significantly improving, we believe that an 
attribution method which related the interest burden of new road 
spending to the rate of growth of traffic would not overstate the 
capital cost of catering for this traffic growth. There would be 
no equivalent adjustment for rail in most cases because there is 
no need for BR to create new infrastructure capacity to meet 
traffic growth. In the past decade virtually all (if not > 
completely all) of BR's infrastructure expenditures would be 
classified as 'maintenance' if they were classified in the way 
road costs are. Only actual 'construction' costs are charged as 
capital for roads. BR 'capital' schemes have been renewals, 
albeit often seeking to improve travel standards but more often 
seeking to reduce operating costs. Hence, rail expenditures 
should continue to be charged on a 'pay as you go' basis. The 
implication for intermodal competition is that this difference in 
charges will properly reflect the costs/benefits to the nation of 
moving traffic from road (where investment costs will be saved by 
there being a reduction in the increasing level of traffic) to 
rail (where adequate capacity already exists), and vice versa. 
An exception to the above argument exists in the London area, 
where growth in commuting and the opening of the Channel Tunnel 
mean that many lines in Kent will be overfull. Usage of these 
lines should in that event attract a premium charge in the same 
way as we discussed for roads. 
4 . 3 . 4  When we turn to maintenance expenditure, there is an 
equivalent procedure. Maintenance expenditure generally relates 
to either the volume of road space provided or the volume of 
traffic passing over it,' 'For maintenance expenditure-of the 
latter type, the appropriate measure of wear should be used to 
allocate costs. Where the expenditure is related to the extent 
and capacity of the road system, then it is also related to 
traffic volumes, but because it is the volume of traffic on the 
road system that has caused the capacity to be there. In this 
case, use of the same measure of the contribution of a particular 
class of vehicle to the traffic flow should be used as in the 
case of capital expenditure. 
4.3.5 Again, we must add some provisos. It may well be that a 
portion of some items of maintenance expenditure is in the nature 
of an overhead, in that it is the price of having a reasonably 
comprehensive road system of at least minimal standard. This 
would be true particularly of spending on minor roads. 
4.4 Measures of Traffic Flow 
4.4.1 Before leaving this section it is worth commenting on what 
measure of traffic flow is appropriate to use in this context. 
Current: procedures for the allocation of capital expenditure use 
PCU (passenger car equivalent) values for capital costs and 
vehicle km. for the relevant items of maintenance costs. The 
former values purport to relate the road capacity requirements of 
each capacity vehicle type to that of a car. We would favour the 
use of whatever measure best reflects the contribution of a 
particular class of vehicle to the case for new roads. Given that 
traffic flow is generally measured in PCUs, it may seem that this 
is the appropriate weight to use when allocating capacity costs 
between vehicle types. Certainly there is no case for using 
vehicle kilometres. But even PCUs may understate the contribution 
of goods vehicles to the case for new roads, for instance on 
environmental grounds. It has been found that in terms of 
environmental nuisance, an HGV is the equivalent of 7 cars 
(Mackie and Davies, 1981, P. 19). The National Audit Office 
argued that the role played by heavy Lorries in justifying new 
road building required a higher capital cost allocation to them 
than is currently made (National Audit Office, 1987, p 27). 
5. The Existina Au~roach 
5.1 The 1968 Road Track Costs Revort 
5.1.1 Present U.K. DTp. practice is a cost allocation exercise, 
whereby all public costs occasioned by road traffic are allocated 
to individual types of vehicle. The methodological underpinning 
dates back to the 1968 Road Track Costs report (Ministry of 
Transport, 1968). The methods were endorsed in Paper 6 of the 
1976 Transport Consultation Document (Department of the 
Environment, 1976). This section will consider the reasons for 
the choice of this method, try to explain simply and briefly how 
the method is put into practice, and highlight some of the areas 
where the method has either been revised over the years or has 
been the subject of review. 
5.1.2 The 1968 Road Track Costs Report (p4) presents the 
following categorisation of road costs: 
"Costs can be conveniently grouped into three catggories: 
User, Public and Community. User costs are costs, such as 
petrol, oil and tyres, and the time involved in travelling, 
which directly fall on road users. Public costs consist 
mainly of road construction and maintenance expenditures, 
and fall upon central and local government. Community costs 
are those occasioned by road users which do not fall on the 
road user himself nor on the government, but on other 
members of the community ... 
"Some costs, accident costs for example, fall into each 
category. A motorist causes, and suffers an accident. What- 
ever his insurance, it is likely that he will be put at 
least to some expense as a result. The state will often have 
to meet costs imposed on the National Health Service or pay 
social security benefits. Finally there may be others 
affected by the accident, pedestrians or relatives of the 
motorist, who also experience costs arising from it. By the 
definition used here, the first group are user costs, the 
second public costs, and the third community costs.'~ 
5.1.3 The report went on to consider 'charging principles1 and 
opted for Long Run Marginal Cost Pricing (LRMC) . However, 'user 
costs1 were not to be charged for as they were internal to road 
users, ie. they were already borne by road users. Community costs 
were excluded on grounds of difficulty in estimation, and because 
of a belief that direct regulations might be the best way of 
controlling these costs. 
5.1.4 Having decided to charge just the public costs of road 
usage, on the LRMC principle, the report considered next two 
approaches to the allocation. It rejected a Cost-Benefit 
approach, citing the joint cost problem and the difficulty of 
assessing benefits as the main reasons. The report chose the Cost 
Responsibility approach as the best approximation available, 
whilst recognising that (p29) "it suffers from important 
deficiences". The report gave (p29) the following description of 
the approach: 
'!The basic method is to consider each cost item in turn and 
attempt to isolate any component which can be said to be 
incurred for a partii ar vehicle class. Such costs are then 
allocated to that class. When this is done, the remaining 
costs can be shared between vehicles by some measure related 
to their use of roads, eg. vehicle miles.I1 
5.1.5 The report discussed the deficiences of the approach as 
follows: 
"Because of the impossibility of charging for particular 
types of road or particular journeys, it is likely that the 
charge on some will be too high and on others too low. Thus 
only limited economic significance can be drawn from the 
fact that heavy commercial vehicles cover their costs as 
allocated here, or that any other vehicle class does. These 
costs are not the public costs that would be saved were 
these vehicles to cease to use the roads if, for example, 
the traffic were transferred from road to rail. This is 
partly because the changes that result from allocating the 
total roads cost over all vehicles must necessafily be 
averages of cost conditions over all roads, and not only 
those on which competitive traffic moves, but also because 
of the nature of road costs. In most circumstances a' given 
percentage change in traffic will not lead to an equivalent 
proportionate change in cost, i.e. marginal costs are 
unlikely to be the same as average costs. In some 
circumstances they may be more, in others less - wherever 
there are joint costs, this is likely to occur.'' 
5.1.6 A particular problem area is the decision as to what 
capital charge to include. For Long Run Marginal Costs we require 
that a sufficient capital charge be levied to cover the cost of 
continually providing sufficient road space for the current 
traffic demand. All costs incurred in the past are ignored. The 
method of capital charging favoured by the report is known as the 
Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) method. In this method the annual capital 
charge is set equal to the current year's investment expenditure. 
In the Long Run, the sum of capital charges will equal the sum of 
capital expenditures. The report felt that its recommendations 
were the best practical approximation to LRMC. The rationale of 
the approach was restated in Paper 6 of the 1976 DOE Consultative 
Document on Transport Policy, and accepted in the 1977 Transport 
Policy White Paper. 
5.1.7 Objections to the above methodology have been numerous. 
Beesley and Gwilliam (1977,p222) critised the arbitrariness of 
the capital total allocated. Capital expenditure on roads might 
fluctuate from year to year for reasons unconnected with the 
demand for road space. The Department have allowed for this to 
some extent by using averages for 3 years. While this will reduce 
the effect of particularly abnormal years, it remains the case 
that if public expenditure is cut back for wider macroeconomic 
reasons, then capital expenditure on roads may be held below the 
level required to properly cater for the growing level of road 
use. 
5.1.8 Currently, estimates of Road Track Costs are prepared 
annually by DTp. and forwarded to the Treasury for consideration 
by the Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time of the preparation 
of his annual Budget. The figures are reported in annual editions 
of 'The allocation of road track costs1. In general, figures used 
are averages of three years: the year preceding the year in which 
the calculation is being done; the current year; and the 
following year (this being the year for which the estimates are 
to apply, and for which they are dated). Financial years are 
used. It is immediately apparent that 'outturn' figures are only 
available for the first of the three years, so that the end 
results are heaily influenced by estimates made at this stage. An 
exception to this is that 'Police1 expenditure is estimated by 
the Home Office as the average of the 3 most recent years for 
which outturn data is available. 
5.2 The 1984 Revisions to the Method 
5.2.1 A major revision in the methods used was made in 1984 
following a short consultation exercise in 1983. The major change 
introduced was to carry out the cost allocation exercise 
separately for 4 different classes of road: Motorway(M), 
Trunk(T) , Principal (P) , and Other (0) . For maintenance- costs, 
this is clearly an improvement on previous procedures. For 
capital costs, however, it appears to assume that motorways are 
only built in response to traffic growth on motorways, and 
similarly for other road types. The first two of these road 
types are the responsibility of the Department of Transport, 
while Local Authorities are responsible for the other two. A 
major effect on the calculations was made by the simultaneous 
realisation that what had previously been regarded as an 
'administration cost' to be spread pro-rata over all heads of 
expenditure were, in reality, only relevent to Local 
Authority maintenance expenditures. It is now argued that all 
other expenditure heads have already had their 
administation overhead added at an eqrlier stage. A charge for 
Department of Transport administrative and research costs is 
still pro-rated across all expenditure heads. 
5.3 The Cost Allocation Process 
5.3.1 The cost allocation process starts, then, with 8 figures 
representing capital and current costs each broken down by the 4 
classes of road. Two more input figures are required : that for 
'police' costs, and that for 'road safety1. We have mentioned 
police costs earlier. These comprise estimated costs of traffic 
police, traffic wardens, and court costs (although this last item 
has not been explicitly mentioned for some years). Road safety 
costs, which had not previously been explicitly mentioned, 
account for £27.4 million in the 1986/87 calculations. Like 
police costs, they are allocated by road types in proportion to 
vehicle kilometrage. Figures for vehicle kilometrage by road type 
are also absent from the report, but for 1986/87 they were: 
Motorway 12.7% 
Trunk 18.0% 
Principal 36.2% 
Other 33.2% 
5.4 Capital Costs 
5.4.1 We shall first consider the allocation of capital costs. 
For each of the 4 road classes the DTp. allocate 15% of the 
capital cost figure to vehicles over 1.525 tonnes unladen weight 
according to their maximum gross vehicle weights times the 
kilometres run (Max. GVW km.) and the remaining 85% is allocated 
to all vehicles (including those over 1.525 tonnes unladen) 
according to their Passenger Car Unit (PCU) values times 
kilometres run (PCU km.).In this calculation the 15% is taken to 
represent those capital costs only required to permit the use of 
large and heavy vehicles. Structures need to be taller, wider and 
stronger to cater for certain vehicles and various studies of 
road schemes have indicated that approximately 15% of the capital 
cost is incurred in this way. The latest official report to 
support the 15% figure has never been published. We are aware of 
EEC sponsored research into car-only motorways, which suggests 
that these may be constructed for around two-thirds of the 
capital cost of an equivalent all-purpose motorway (Echenique, 
1987). The main reason for this diference appears to be that 
Echenique has allowed for narrower lane widths in the absence of 
heavy vehicles whereas DTp has not. As a very modest sensitivity 
test, therefore, we have-reworked the DTp method with -a 20:80 
split instead of 15:85. 
5.4.2 The Department allocate the 85% remaining capital costs by 
PCU km. on the grounds that this is a charge for the provision of 
additional roadspace and so should be paid for in proportion to 
the current usage of roadspace. Past studies indicated that, for 
the lorries then extant, an average lorry required twice as much 
roadspace as a car. It was evident that larger lorries took up 
more roadspace than smaller lorries and so the Department 
assigned gradually increasing PCU values ranging from 1.1 for 
lorries between 3.5 and 5 tonnes, up to 2.9 for lorries over 31 
tonnes. The average for lorries started off at 2, but over time 
as lorries became larger, the average rose to 2.2. This was the 
position in 1983 at the time of a major revision to the 
Department's methods. It was then claimed that a new piece of 
TRRL research had found that the average value for lorries should 
be only 2. However, the work relates to delays at junctions and 
thus is only relevant for certain road types - it is not the 
appropriate measure for motorways. 
5.4.3 On this evidence, the Department revised its PCU values to 
give an average of 2.0 for lorries. Rather than scale down all 
the lorry PCU values by lo%, the Department chose to reduce the 
PCU values for the largest lorries the most. Accordingly, the PCU 
value for lorries over 31 tonnes fell from 2.9 to 2.5, with this 
new value applying equally to the newly introduced 38 tonne 
lorries on the grounds that they were no bigger than 32 tonne 
artics . 
5.5 Maintenance Costs 
5.5.1 If we take the figures for road safety away from the 
current cost figures we get what the Department calls Maintenance 
costs. Table 3 of the 1986/87 report shows the percentages of 
each of the 4 maintenance totals that fall under each of 14 cost 
headings. The table also shows how costs under each of the 14 
headings are to be allocated; the 4 possibilities (parameters) 
the Department use being: Vehicle km.; Average Gross Vehicle 
Weight (GVW) km. ; Standard Axle km. ; and Pedestrians. The 
allocation for each of the 14 cost headings are the same for all 
4 road classes, except that Pedestrians are relieved of any share 
of Motorway costs - with their 'share' being reallocated. 
5.5.2 The manner of the allocation of costs by each of the 14 
headings to each of the first three parameters is governed by 
technical advice after consultation. We are not at the present 
time questioning any of these allocations, although the evidence 
for them appears scant. We note, however, that many changes have 
been made in the past - nearly all resulting in lower cost 
allocations to heavy lorries. 
5.5.3 In the current DTp. allocation, Pedestrians are currently 
allocated 50% of Sweeping and cleaning; Footways, cycle tracks 
and kerbs; and Street lighting; - except on motorways where they 
are allocated no costs. Given the arbitrariness of this 
procedure, we undertook sensitivity tests on this item, but it 
made little difference to the results and is not discussed 
further. 
..-. .. 
- 
5.5.4 Reconstruction and resurfacing costs, and 80% of patching 
and minor repair costs are allocated by Standard axle w. The 
definition of a Standard axle takes account of the 'fourth power 
law1 relating road damage done by axleweights applied. The exact 
DTp. definition is complicated by the switch from imperial to 
metric measurements, so we shall quote the DTp. definition 
verbatim (p3, 1986/87 report) : 
''A Standard axle is a computational device for comparing the 
damaging effects of different vehicles, taking account of 
the 'fourth power law' of road pavement damage. The 
'Standard Axle1 value of a particular vehicle can be 
calculated by summing the fourth powers of the weights (in 
tons) on each axle, and dividing by 10 to the power 4 (ie 
10,000). Thus for a fully laden 16 tons, 2 axle rigid 
vehicle with estimated axle weights of 6 tons and 10 tons, 
the 'Standard axles' would be:- 
= 1.1296 in imperial tons 
ie. the vehicle does 1.1296 times as much damage to the road 
pavement as a 10 tons axle. In this paper, axle weights 
quoted in metric tonnes have been used to calculate 
'Standard axles1 and the divisor has been 10.16 to the power 
4, ie. 10 imperial ton~~224001b.'~ 
5.5.5 The DTp. use data from the Continuing Survey of Road Goods 
Traffic (CSRGT) to estimate the proportion of kilometres that a 
lorry of a particular type will run whilst empty, 5%, 15%, 25%, 
35%, 45%, 55%, 65%, 75%, 85%, and 95% laden. Using these 
proportions gives what the DTp. term 'average standard axles'. 
For instance, for the 16 ton, 2 axle rigid discussed above, the 
'average standard axle' value is 0.2659, compared to the fully 
laden value of 1.1296. The 1986/87 report comments as follows: 
''The weights on axles are assumed weights calculated for 
each degree of lading by comparing the axle weights of the 
unladen vehicle with those of a fully laden vehicle and 
assuming that intermediate loads give axle weights 
proportionately intermediate between the unladen and fully 
laden axle weights. The fact that some of the heavier 
vehicles have axles weighing above their legal limits is 
ignored, so the effect is to understate the damage caused by 
vehicles with assumed axle weights between 9 and 10 tons 
and, for articulated vehicles over 32.5 tonnes gwr, up to 
10.5 tonnes." 
5.5.6 It is therefore clear that the responsibility for road 
damage due to overloading is ignored in the DTp. calculations, 
the costs so caused being allocated over all vehicle types in 
accordance with their legal axle weights. However, it is clear 
that the arithmetic of the fourth power relationship will mean 
that it is only the overloading of the already heaviest axles 
that will cause significant extra costs. Hence lorries with such 
axles should themselves shoulder the burden of paying these 
costs. Exactly which types of lorry these are, and in what 
proportions, can be determined from the Transport and Road 
Research Laboratory (TRRL) surveys of overloading. The CSRGT is 
no help in this regard since it is an unchecked self-completion 
questionnaire, so it is unsurprising that instances of 
overloading are not reported. Later in this paper we will test 
the sensitivity of the DTp. methods to this point. It may be 
argued that opperators of overloaded vehicles can be fined if 
caught, thereby more fairly representing the cost causation. 
However, given the current prevalance of overloading, as revealed 
in TRRL surveys and elsewhere we doubt whether this penalty 
adequately reflects the social costs involved. In any event, 
failure to take explicit account of overloading will lead to a 
misallocation of costs between vehicle types. 
5.5.7 The use of the 'fourth power law1 has been subject to much 
debate. The 1968 Road Track Costs report used a third power rule. 
This was changed to the fourth power in the 1976 Consultation 
Document. Since then, a reworking of earlier results on which the 
fourth power law was based has been carried out by TRRL (Addis 
and Whitmarsh (1981)). For strong and very strong pavements, 
with structural numbers 5.18 and 5.97 respectively, the results 
are very close to a fourth power curve, although a slight kink at 
the upper end of the curve for very strong pavements with heavy 
axles has been interpreted in some quarters as indicating a power 
as low as three. 
5.5.8 For medium strength roads (structural number 3.54) the 
appropriate power appears to be slightly below 4, but there is a 
pronounced kink in the curve, after which for very heavy axle 
weights the curve is best represented by a power of about 6. For 
weak pavement roads (structural number 2.38) the kink occurs much 
earlier, so that for typical UK axleweights the power is about 6. 
The foregoing observations are based on Figures 3 to 6 of the 
report, but is in agreement with the conclusions of that paper, 
where the conclusion is that compared to the fourth power law 
their work: 
I1indicates reasonable agreement except for the medium and 
heavy spectra of wheel loads applied to the weakest 
pavements when the ... analysis indicates a greater damaging 
ef fectrl. 
5.5.9 This is not a misleadingly selective reporting of their 
conclusions. Nowhere do they suggest using a lower power, for 
any purpose. It is therefore incorrect for DTp to say in their 
consultation document that IITRRL results indicate a sixth power 
relationship for some roads and a third power relationship for 
others1'. 
5.5.10 In any event the DTp. did not feel the evidence was 
sufficiently commanding as to warrant its inclusion in the 1984 
revised methods which did otherwise differentiate by road type. 
5.5.11 The Armitage committee favoured the continued use of the 
fourth power law (Armitage, 1980, p113): 
"The fourth power law has been derived from largD-scale 
experiments carried out by the American Association of State 
Highway officials (AASHO) between 1958 and 1960. In these 
experiments, a series of roads were constructed, each road 
having sections of widely differing strengths. Different 
types of lorry, with single axles varying between 0.9 tonnes 
and 13.6 tonnes and tandem axles varying between 1.9 tonnes 
and 21.8 tonnes, were driven over the roads in a continuous 
stream, each road carrying lorries of one type only. The 
deterioration of all sections of the roads was measured. The 
results showed how many applications of a given axle load 
led to a given amount of physical damage, from which the 
relative damaging powers of different axle loads have been 
calculated. The AASHO tests suggest a statistical 
relationship between the fourth power of the static axle 
load and the damage done to the road.... 
"The tests were well designed and on a scale which should 
give statistically significant results. There does not 
appear to be any work that has fundamentally challenged the 
fourth power relationship ... On the other hand, it would be 
wrong to draw over-precise conclusions from them.... There 
is still much uncertainty as to axles damage roads, and 
hence also wJg the fourth power law should have emerged. A 
number of much more limited experiments on various aspects 
of the damage mechanism have suggested that anything between 
a third power and a sixth power relationship might obtain 
for different elements of damage. Nevertheless, all the 
authorities responsible for the design of roads or for 
regulations on the weight of lorries appear to use the 
fourth power law as giving the best overall indication of 
the relationship between the damage done to roads and the 
vehicles responsible for that damage. It remains the best 
single approximation we have." 
5.5.12 The remaining road maintenance costs are split between 
'Average GVW km. and 'Vehicle km. I, again based on '!expert 
advice from highway engineers and research scienti~ts'~. We are 
not going to question the detail here, although there have been 
many objections in the past and DTp. practice has varied over the 
years. What we will test, however, is the replacement of the 
Vehicle km. parameter by a Passenger Car Unit (PCU) km parameter. 
The argument here is that the Department accept the use of a PCU 
measure when allocating capital costs. PCU values are taken to 
represent the demand for road space, so the DTp. are saying that 
expenditures on new road space should be paid for in proportion 
to the present (growing) usage of road space. We are taking the 
argument one logical step further by suggesting that 
consequential maintenance costs of having road space (such as 
drainage, hedge cutting etc.) should also be allocated according 
to the demand for road space, ie. by PCUs. There is therefore no 
case for allocating any costs by Vehicle km. Where the department 
have identified costs as relating to other vehicle parameters 
(currently Average GVW km. and Standard axle km.) we have 
accepted this in this paper. 
5.5.13 We should at this stage mention an argument which is 
sometimes heard, and which may have been given credence by a 
recent paper on the subject (Newbery, 1987). This is that a 
proportion of maintenance- costs (taken by Newbery to be- 60% in 
the British climate) is caused by weathering, regardless of 
traffic levels. In his calculations, this is therefore treated 
as a capacity cost, to be allocated by PCUs rather than as 
above. The justification for the formula he uses to derive 
this figure is unclear. He quotes an earlier paper of his, which 
gives a source, but the formula there is (at least) twice 
modified without justification before it reaches the form given 
in Newbery (1987). The calibration data apparently only relates 
to Brazil, and we have doubts about the ability of the 
calibration method to distinguish between the average level of 
standard axles passing per unit of time and the passage of time 
itself, as well as the transferability of the results. 
5.5.14 In the case of major British roads, both construction and 
maintenance are planned on the basis of a life measured in terms 
of the numbers of standard axles passing, with no reference to 
elapsed time. We can therefore take the present DTp system of 
allocating 100% of road costs as being quite reasonable, except 
to the extent that some (minor) roads are maintained for purposes 
of accessibility even when their capacity is not really needed. 
5.6 Determininq the Tax/Cost Ratios for Individual Vehicle 
Tyves 
5.6.1 Applying the percentages in Table 3 to the maintenance 
figures by road class, and applying the 15%-85% split to capital 
expenditure figures by road class, gives us the figures in Table 
2 'Road costs for 1986/87 classified by road class and 
parameter1. The overall total expenditure is shown as £3863M, 
which breaks down M=599, T=644, P=1053, 0=1567 by road class, and 
as follows by parameter: 
Maximum GVW km. 240 
PCU km. 1359 
---- Total capital 
Standard axle km. 610 
Average GVW km. 408 
Vehicle km. 957 (includes Police and Road Safety) 
Pedestrians 290 
---- Total current and police £2264 
5.6.2 Tables 6 and 7 give data on individual vehicle types, 
including sufficient information to be able to deduce vehicle 
parameter values (ie. PCUs, Standard axles etc.). We now multiply 
these parameter per vehicle figures by vehicle numbers, by kms. 
per vehicle and by percentages of kms. on each road class (shown 
in Table 4). We do this for each vehicle type seperately and then 
sum over vehicle types. This gives the totals of parameter units 
by vehicle types and by road classes. We next divide these 
figures into the appropriate cost totals in Table 2 (discussed 
above). This gives unit costs by parameter for each road class 
and these are shown in Table 5. We now multiply these unit costs 
by the units used, ie. the parameter kms. by a vehicle of each 
type on each class of road. By again using the road type usage 
distributions from Table 4 we form weighted averages to get total 
costs for a vehicle of that type. For lorries this is ghown in 
Table 8, while for other vehicle types the DTp. report gives 
figures for totals of each vehicle type (in Table 6). 
5.6.3 Having thus completed the cost side,we form tax estimates 
as Vehicle Excise Duty (VED - the tax disk, or Road Fund Licence) 
plus Fuel Tax per km. times the total number of kms. per vehicle. 
Dividing these tax estimates by cost give tax cost ratios, shown 
for lorries in Table 8 and for other vehicle types in Table 9. 
These calculations ignore the stage-carriage fuel tax rebate for 
buses, and car tax. Our view is that general fuel duty (2.7%) 
should also be deducted, since this is a general tax, but we have 
not made this deduction in this paper. 
5.6.4 All the Department's calculations are carried out for an 
'average1 vehicle in each vehicle type (eg 29-31 tonne rigids). 
In particular, average values for kilometres run are used. This 
has the consequence that, since costs are taken to vary 
proportionately with kms while taxes vary less than 
proportionately (due to the VED 'intercept1 or 'fixed cost1 
element) with kms, the ratio of taxes to costs will fall as kms 
rise. For example, if the tax:cost ratio was fixed for a 
particular type at exactly the desired level for the type as a 
whole, then vehicles travelling lower than average distances in a 
year will have higher than desired tax:cost ratios, and vice 
versa. As an indication of how large this effect is for the 
various lorry types, we have computed an additional column to add 
on to the end of the DTpts table. This column gives the 
'breakeven distance1 at which taxes just equal costs, for those 
vehicles for which the fuel tax per km is not itself greater than 
the allocated cost per km. Readers should bear in mind, however, 
the recomendation of the Armitage committee that desired tax:cost 
ratios for heavy lorries should be greater than one, in order to 
allow for unmeasured external costs caused by these vehicles. We 
shall consider some of the items of cost not presently charged 
for in sections 8, 9, and 10. 
6. The Adeauacv of the Current Level of S~endinq 
6.1 Ex~enditure on Roads 
6.1.1 Road track costs allocated to individual vehicles are 
dependent on the total expenditure on roads, both in terms of the 
level of maintenance and in investment in new roads, whether they 
be motorways or bypasses. There is increasing evidence that the 
level of spending in Great Britain is not keeping pace with the 
growth in the demand for road space as a result of low 
investment, and that the maintenance budget is insufficient to 
keep the roads up to the standard of previous years. If these 
propositions are true, then basing allocations on the present 
level of spending will understate long run costs. 
6.1.2 Since 1980 the National Road Maintenance Condition Survey 
has shown a steady deterioration in the condition of our road 
system. The deterioration varies according to the class of road. 
In the case of trunk roads and principal urban roads, their 
overall condition is now much worse than it was in 1977 (Standing 
Committee on Highway Maintenance, 1986). The current level of 
reconstruction is not keeping pace with demand. 
- 
6.1.3 Though maintenancde';xpenditure has remained fairly static 
in real terms, this is unlikely to be sufficient to keep roads in 
the same state when they are being used more intensively. Over 
the last decade, not only has the distance covered by vehicles in 
total risen (by 35%), but the distance covered by 4 and 5 axle 
artics has increased even more (by 58%) despite the heavier loads 
carried by the larger lorries now permitted. See Tables 4.1 and 
4.2. There has also been an increase in maximum permitted axle 
weights (currently 10.5 tonnes for a drive axle). 
6.1.4 Thus there has been a large increase in the number of 
standard axles imposed on parts of our road system over the last 
decade, particularly on motorways. The trend towards using the 
heaviest vehicles has continued following the introduction of 38t 
five axle artics in 1983. 
6.1.5 The design of a motorway is based mainly on an estimate of 
the number of vehicles passing over it during a twenty year 
period in the case of flexible pavements, and forty years in the 
case of concrete. The volume of traffic is converted into an 
estimate of the number of standard axles in the period, and this 
determines the strength of the structure required. Thus the road 
is built to withstand a fixed number of standard axles passing 
over it, rather than being designed to last for a given number 
years. This means that a concentration of heavier vehicles, 
primarily using motorways, may lead to a considerable increase in 
the number of standard axles above those estimated, and 
reconstruction costs may be incurred in a shorter period of time 
than originally planned. This could lead to fluctuations in the 
maintenance budget allocated to such roads. 
6.1.6 Evidence shows that while the demand for road space has 
risen steadily over the decade, capital expenditure has fallen in 
real terms by some 50% (Table 4.2) . We argued above that there 
should be a proportional relationship between capital spending 
and the arowth of road traffic. Though maintenance expenditure 
has remained nearly static in real terms, this is clearly not 
sufficient to cope with the higher level of use of the road 
system. The supposition is therefore, that the present level of 
spending understates the true long run cost of providing for the 
current level of, and growth in traffic. 
7. Sensitivitv Testinq 
7.1.1 Using a proprietary spreadsheet for a micro-computer, the 
figures published in 'The allocation of road track costs 
1986/87I(DTp. 1986) have been subjected to various sensitivity 
tests. This was undertaken to determine whether changes in the 
allocation of costs would have a significant effect on the 
operating costs of goods vehicles. Several tests were undertaken 
to demonstrate the effect of altering the allocation of costs 
within the current level of expenditure, then the level of 
capital expenditure was increased, firstly to that obtaining in 
the early 1970s, and secondly by 133% (as suggested in section 
4.1) so that each vehicle km. is charged its marginal capital 
cost. The results of the various sensitivity tests are given in 
Table 7.1. The effect of the sensitivity calculations has also 
been added cumulatively, the results of these being given in 
Table 7.3. - .A. . 
T a b l e  7.1 
summarv of s e n s i t i v i t v  T e s t s .  
Co lumn 1  2  3  4 5  6 
V e h i c l e  c l a s s  
C a r s  + v a n s  
Buses  
H G V  r i g i d s  
2 a x l e  7 . 5 t  
2 a x l e  1 7 t  
3  a x l e  2 5 t  
4 a x l e  3 1 t  
H G V  a r t i c s  
2+1 a x l e  2 5 t  
2+2 a x l e  2 8 t  
2+2 a x l e  3 2 . 5 t  
2+3 a x l e  3 8 t  
3+2  a x l e  3 8 t  
3+3 a x l e  3 8 t  
Column 
1 R e s u l t  u s i n g  DTp d a t a .  
2  F i g u r e s  u s i n g  f u e l  c o n s u m p t i o n  t a k e n  f r o m  FTA C o s t  T a b l e s .  
3  F i g u r e s  f o r  V e h i c l e  kin c o n v e r t e d  t o  PCU km. 
4 A v e r a g e  GVU km a n d  S t a n d a r d  A x l e  km as  p e r  C h e s h i r e  s u r v e y .  
5 T o t a l  c a p i t a l  e x p e n d i t u r e  i n c r e a s e d  50%. 
6 T o t a l  c a p i t a l  e x p e n d i t u r e  i n c r e a s e d  133%. 
7  T w e n t y  p e r c e n t  c a p i t a l  e x p e n d i t u r e  a p p l i e d  t o  Max. gvw km, 80% t o  PCUkm. 
S u b - c o l u m n  
(i) T a x l c o s t  r a t i o .  
(ii) B r e a k e v e n  d i s t a n c e  ( t h o u s a n d  k i l o m e t r e s  p e r  annum). 
7.2 Fuel Consum~tion 
7.2.1 DTp. estimates the revenue taken from each class of 
vehicle by multiplying the average mileage run by vehicles of 
that class in the Continuing Survey of Roads Goods Transport 
(DTp. 1986c) by an estimate of the rate of fuel consumption. 
This is taken from the theoretical results produced by Renouf 
(1981). DTp. (198633) comments (P. 2) that 81Estimates have been 
updated taking account of recent data". 
7.2.2 The resulting figures for fuel consumption by the heavier 
classes of HGV are substantially higher than those used in the 
FTA cost tables (which we regard as the most reliable source of 
information on the costs of operating goods vehicles). Column 2 
of Table 7.1 shows the effect of reworking the revenue/cost 
ratios with the reduced levels of fuel tax payment implied by the 
FTA. tables. The biggest effect is on 38 tonne vehicles, which 
on these assumptions are paying only 12-14% in excess of 
allocated cost, rather than the 25-31% implied by the DTp 
figures. 
7.3 The Use of PCU km 
7.3.1 In column 3 of Table 7.1, costs currently allocated to 
vehicle kilometers were related instead to PCU km. This again 
increased the proportion of the costs borne by HGV's In the case 
of 32.5t 4-axle artics the Tax/Cost ratio fell from 1.31 to 1.27. 
This is because such a lorry is assessed to be the equivalent of 
2.5 PCU9s, whereas in terms of Vehicle km they are considered to 
be equal to that of a car. Similar falls were recorded for other 
goods vehicles. 
7.4 Mean Axle Weiahts 
7.4.1 As discussed in paragraph 5.5.6 the allocation of costs by 
the DTp does not take account of the possibility of overloading, \ 
on the grounds that they should assume people are law abiding and 
leave the legal system to deal with miscreants. However, the 
damage caused by overloaded vehicles charged for, since it is 
part of the maintenance cost allocated. As the Average GVW and 
Standard axle figures used by DTp. are those reported in a self 
completion survey (CSRGT, DTp. 1 9 8 6 ~ ) ~  these figures for a given 
lorry class will be underestimates. Hence the allocated cost per 
parameter unit will be inflated. 
7.4.2 An alternative source of data on vehicle and axle weights 
is from surveys conducted on lorries stopped randomly. Results 
of five such surveys have been reported by TRRL, two of which 
were undertaken at Motorway sites (Prudhoe, 1982 and Shane, 
1982), and the other three on Trunk roads (Glover, 1980; Glover 
and Shane, 1981). We attempted to use this data to revise 
Average GVW and Standard Axle figures in the track costs 
calculation. However, there were problems with this, largely 
because of the absence of data relating to Principal and Other 
roads, and because the representativeness of the 5 sites even for 
Motorways and Trunk roads was questioned. In particular, it was 
pointed out that one of the five sites was near docks, so that 
the widespread overloacring found there might be a-rather 
specialised occurance. The implication was, therefore, that our 
calculations were overestimating the extent of overloading. 
7.4.3 Recently we have obtained the results from a random sample 
of 4216 HGVs collected during 22 axle-load surveys conducted at 
18 survey sites with locations dispersed throughout the county of 
Cheshire. The report (Urqhhart and Rhodes, 1987) states that the 
survey sites were chosen carefully to represent eight classes of 
road and four ranges of heavy commercial vehicle flow. The 
survey therefore provides the sort of data we need. We are not 
claiming here that the weighting of road types in the total 
sample gives a correct representation of Cheshire, let alone 
Great Britain. (Further work with the raw data from the surveys, 
doing the necessary reweighting, would be highly desirable.) 
Cheshire was chosen as a fairly llaveragell county and our view is 
that the measured Average GVW and Standard Axles are probably 
closer to the true national values than those used by DTp, which 
clearly underestimate these values by excluding all overloading. 
7.4.4 Table 7.2 shows the differences between the Cheshire and 
DTp figures. The Cheshire figures are, as expected, always 
higher than the DTp figures, although for 3 axle rigids the 
difference is very small. The biggest proportionate difference 
in Standard Axles is for light rigid 2 axle vehicles, which were 
particularly prone to overloading in the Cheshire survey. By 
contrast, the biggest proportionate difference in Average GVW was 
for 3 axle artics, where no overloading was found in Cheshire, 
but properly loaded vehicles were much heavier than would be 
expected from the DTp figures. Since the average plated weights 
were the same for both, we concluded that the difference was not 
arising because of a difference in size of 3 axle artics in 
Cheshire compared to elsewhere. 
Table 7.2 
Com~arison of Lorrv Weiahts-DTu versus Cheshire Survev 
HGV Axle 
Group 
Average GVW Standard Axles 
DTP Cheshire DTP Cheshire 
Figures Study Figures Study 
Rigid 
2-axle<7.5t 3.90 4.22 
2-axle>7.5t 8.42 9.03 
3-axle 14.85 14.88 
4-axle 19.90 22.43 
Atric 
3-axle 
4-axle 
5-axle 
6-axle 
Source:- Derived from The Allocation of Road Track Costs 1986/87 
and TORG Research Report 64. 
7.4.5 The results of usi-ng the Cheshire lorry weights ih place 
of the DTp figures is given in Column 4 of Table 7.1. Comparing 
these with the DTp figures in column 1 shows tax/cost ratios 
increasing for buses (where we have no "~verloading~~ data) for 3 
axle 25 t rigids, and for 4 axle artics. We think this latter 
reflects a change in working practices, whereby the heavier loads 
previously carried by 4 axle artics are now tending to be carried 
by the new 5 axle 38 t artics, thereby reducing the average load 
carried by the 4 axle artics. Tax/cost ratios fall for 2 and 4 
axle rigids, with the maximum weight 4 axle rigids (31 t) falling 
below unity (to 0.91). For 4 axle rigids the Cheshire survey 
found 53% of laden vehicles to be overloaded (by an average of 
4.3% of plated weight) . Tax/cost ratios also fall for 3 and 5 
axle artics, for the reasons previously discussed. The Cheshire 
survey is the first published evidence on the extent of 
overloading of 38 t artics, about 25% of them exceeding the 
maximum weight restriction. 
7.5 Increase in Total Cavital Emenditure 
7.5.1 We have argued earlier that the existing level of capital 
spending may be too low to prevent a deterioration in road 
conditions. We have tested the effect of returning to the 
spending levels of the early 1970s. From Table 4.2 this can be 
seen to require roughly a 50% increase, and this is the figure we 
have used. The result is shown in column 5; the tax/cost ratio 
of a 32.5 t artic being reduced to 1.09, with similar effects for 
other vehicles. 
7.5.2 If the capital charge were increased by 133% which may be 
the sort of magnitude required to implement a true long run 
marginal cost pricing regime (see section 4.1), then few HGV 
classes would cover their track costs. This is shown in column 
6, where all the popular types of HGV can be seen to have 
tax/cost ratios below unity some HGVs plated for less than the 
maximum for that axle configuration are, however, above unity. 
The ratio of a 32.5 t artic becomes 0.85, 38 t vehicles being 
slightly lower. \ 
7.6 Cavital Costs Svecificall~ Allocated to HGV1s 
7.6.1 Because lorries are larger and heavier than other 
vehicles, they require different specifications for the design of 
roads to that of cars, such as higher and stronger bridges, when 
road construction is undertaken. Thus 15% of capital expenditure 
on roads is allocated specifically to lorries and other large 
vehicles according to their Maximum GVW km. As cars and 
motorcycles are assigned a Maximum GVW of 0, the effect is to 
allocate all of capital charges assessed under this parameter to 
goods vehicles and buses. The remaining 85% of Capital costs are 
allocated to all vehicles in proportion to their PCU values. As 
discussed above, evidence suggests that the 15% allocation may be 
an underestimate. 
7.6.2 The allocation of costs between these measures was 
altered, to 20:80 to test the degree of sensitivity (column 7). 
The result was to reduce the tax/cost ratio for a 32.5t artic 
from 1.31 to 1.24, with similar effects for 38 tonners. 
T a b l e  7 .3  
C u m u l a t i v e  R e s u l t s  of S e n s i t i v i t y  T e s t s .  
Column 1  2  3  4 5 6 
V e h i c l e  c l a s s  
C a r s  + v a n s  
Buses  
H G V  r i g i d s  
2  a x l e  7 . 5 t  
2  a x l e  1 7 t  
3  a x l e  2 5 t  
4 a x l e  3 1 t  
HGV a r t i c s  
2+1 a x l e  2 5 t  
2+2 a x l e  2 8 t  
2+2 a x l e  3 2 . 5 t  
2+3 a x l e  3 8 t  
3+2  a x l e  3 8 t  
3+3 a x l e  3 8 t  
Column 
1  R e s u l t  u s i n g  DTp d a t a .  
2  F i g u r e s  u s i n g  f u e l  c o n s u m p t i o n  t a k e n  f r o m  FTA C o s t  T a b l e s .  
3  As c o l u m n  2  p l u s  f i g u r e s  f o r  V e h i c l e  km c o n v e r t e d  t o  PCU km. 
4 As c o l u m n  3  p l u s  A v e r a g e  G V Y  km a n d  S t a n d a r d  A x l e  km as  p e r  C h e s h i r e  s u r v e y .  
5  As c o l u m n  4 p l u s  t o t a l  c a p i t a l  e x p e n d i t u r e  i n c r e a s e d  50%. 
6 As c o l u m n  4 p l u s  t o t a l  c a p i t a l  e x p e n d i t u r e  i n c r e a s e d  133%. 
S u b - c o l u m n  
( i) T a x l c o s t  r a t i o .  
(ii) B r e a k e v e n  d i s t a n c e  ( t h o u s a n d  k i l o m e t r e s  p e r  annum). 
7.7 Cumulative Effect of Sensitivity Tests 
7.7.1 Although the tests individually have generally produced 
only modest changes in the costs allocated to goods vehicles 
(with the notable exception of capital costs), a number of the 
tests taken cumulatively have a much more substantial effect. The 
results are shown in Table 7.3. 
7.7.2 In Table 7.3, the cumulative effect of changing both the 
fue consumption of HGV1s, and the Vehicle km to PCU km, is 
demonstrated in Column 3. Column 4 includes the additional effect 
of adjusting the Average GVW km and the Standard Axle km to take 
account of the weights of vehicles observed in the Cheshire 
survey. 
7.7.3 When the capital investment in roads is increased to the 
level of the early 19701s (in real terms), as has been done in 
Column 5, then few classes of HGV cover their track costs. 
However, it should be noted that among those which do, just, are 
four axle articulated vehicles. In total, the cumulative effect 
of these measures has had a greater effect on the large rigid 
vehicles than on other vehicle types, though the 2+3 axle 38t 
articulated vehicle would only cover 88% of its' allocated track 
costs. 
7.7.4 Column 6 replaces the 50% increase in capital costs 
assumed in Colum 5 with the 133% argued for in section 4.1. This 
brings the tax/cost ratios for all lorries below 1. 
7.8 Cross Subsidisation bv Mileaae 
7.8.1 Because the total taxation of vehicles includes a fixed 
element in the form of VED, vehicles which cover higher than 
average mileages per year tend to be subsidised by those which do 
below average. In the case of the heaviest lorries there is 
likely to be a double effect, because those covering large 
distances will also be those most likely to be loaded for all or 
part of the return journey. This increases their average GVW km 
and standard axle km considerably, and should increase their 
allocated costs when compared to the average vehicle in their 
class. Operators of long distance goods vehicles may therefore 
pay considerably less in road tax revenues per tonne of payload 
than the average. 
7.8.2 Such a vehicle may nevertheless cover its allocated track 
costs (but with reduced margin to cover environmental effects) 
although this will be decreasingly so the more costs we deem 
chargeable to that vehicle class. So that this matter can be 
investigated, we have included in Tables 7.1 and 7.3 columns 
headed (ii) which give the breakeven distance. This is the 
distance (in kilometres) that a lorry of that class must travel 
to have its tax and costs equal. A dash indicates that the per 
kilometre tax (from fuel) is greater than the per kilometre 
allocated cost so that tax and cost are never equal. When tax 
cost ratios (column i) are less than one the breakeven distance 
is less than the average distance travelled by that class of 
lorry, and vice versa. In all cases the interpretation is that 
any lorries travelling further than the breakeven distances shown 
for their class are failing to cover their costs by the. taxes 
they pay. 
7.8.3 An offsetting effect is likely to be that the vehicles 
with the highest mileages within their class travel a higher 
proportion of their mileage on motorways, where the maintenance 
cost per standard axle is lower, and at night, when they are 
likely to cause less nuisance to other traffic. The mileage 
related taxes levied on goods vehicles in Scandinavia incorporate 
a rebate for very high mileage vehicles for just this reason. 
8. Vehicle Delay 
8.1.1 There are a number of costs, mainly of an environmental 
nature, which- are not considered as part of the system of 
allocating road track costs. Some of these can be identified, and 
costs allocated on the basis of judgement and indicative data. 
Others, such as noise, are largely subjective and more difficult 
to estimate. Where we are able to establish reasonable cost 
estimates, the figures have been used to adjust the normal 
allocation costs. The results are enumerated in Table 8.1. 
8.1.2 Lorries cause delays to other road users in two ways. 
First, they cause delay directly when they use the roads - 
because they are 'more traffic', because they are big and 
therefore more hazardous to overtake than are cars, and because 
they have lower power:weight ratios than other road users and so 
tend to get caught up with. Secondly, because of the generally 
accepted 'fourth power law', it is largely due to lorries that 
reconstruction road works take place, and these of course delay 
road traffic. The Department's own estimate is said to be that 
the delay time disbenefits from such roadworks are up to 40% of 
the material cost of the roadworks. However, the Department make 
no attempt to charge these delay costs to lorries, on the grounds 
that these costs are internal to road users. 
8.1.3 In order to test the effect of inclusion of a cost for 
delay, we have adjusted the value of the parameter of vehicle, 
average gvw, and standard axle kilometers by 40% when applied to 
the following items of expenditure: 
i) Reconstruction and resurfacing. 
ii) Haunching. 
iii) Surface dressing & skid treatments. 
iv) Patching and minor repairs. 
V) Drainage. 
vi) Bridges and remedial earthworks. 
8.1.4 The effect is significant, and is shown in Table 8.1. The 
tax/cost ratio for a 32t artic is reduced from 1.31 to 1.07, 
while that for a 38t with 2+3 axle configuration is reduced from 
1.25 to 1.02. 
T a b l e  8 .1  
R e s u l t s  of S e n s i t i v i t y  T e s t s  : D e l a y  a n d  A c c i d e n t  C o s t s .  
V e h i c l e  c l a s s  
C a r s  + v a n s  
Buses  
H G V  r i g i d s  
2  a x l e  7 . 5 t  
2  a x l e  1 7 t  
3  a x l e  2 5 t  
4 a x l e  3 1 t  
H G V  a r t i c s  
2+1 a x l e  2 5 t  
2+2 a x l e  2 8 t  
2+2 a x l e  3 2 . 5 t  
2+3 a x l e  3 8 t  
3+2  a x l e  3 8 t  
3 + 3  a x l e  3 8 t  
S u b - c o l u m n  
DTP 
a l l o c a t i o n  
D e l a y  
c o s t s  
A c c i d e n t  
c o s t s  
A c c i d e n t  c o s t s  
p e r  m i l l .  p e r  
v e h i c l e  Ym. v e h i c l e  
C i )  V e h i c l e  T a x / c o s t  r a t i o .  
( i i )  B r e a k e v e n  d i s t a n c e  ( t h o u s a n d  k i l o m e t r e s  p e r  annum). 
8.1.5 What should be included in the long run marginal cost of 
road use is the net increase in journey times to other vehicles 
from an extra lorry kilometre, after allowing for the optimal 
level of capital spending. We believe that this will be positive, 
both because lorries delay other vehicles even on uncongested 
roads, and because of the effect of accelerated reconstruction 
referred to above. 
9. Accident Costs 
9.1.1 The 1968 Road Track Costs report (MOT, 1968) included in 
the road costs to be allocated a figure of one sixteenth of total 
road accident costs, as attributable to the net public costs of 
road accidents. The 1976 Consultation Document (DOE, 1976) 
estimated that one quarter of all accident costs were borne by 
the state and the community (as opposed to road users 
themselves), but did not include any of this in the tax:cost 
calculations. The Armitage committee (Armitage, 1980), however, 
in its reccomendation 4, said that the public costs of accidents 
should be included in the calculation of road track costs. The 
DTpts response came in their 1983 proposals (DTp. 1983). It was 
there proposed to accept the Armitage recommendation, and 
allocate £150 million to vehicles, of which lorries were to pick 
up £8 million. These figures were said to represent the public 
expenditure on ambulance and medical services, and social 
security benefits arising from road accidents. These costs were 
allocated to vehicle types according to the frequency and 
severity of the accidents in which they are involved. As it was 
not thought possible to establish vehicles8 differing degrees of 
responsibility, a straightforward sharing was used. The proposals 
received little support. 
9.1.2 Those who did want accident costs to be included argued 
for a much heavier weighting against lorries because they cause 
more damage in an accident than a car would. The Department 
rejected this, confusing the responsibility of the vehicle with 
that of the driver. Clearly, there must be many accidents where 
the lorry driver is blameless, but the lorry is responsible for 
the accident being much worse than it otherwise would have been. 
The Secretary of State took the view that it would be 
discriminatory to charge accident costs to road users "since 
other industries and high risk sports do not pay in this way for 
the costs they cause to public fundstt. As to community costs, 
these were to be dealt with as part of the 'margin' for social 
and environmental costs, as we shall see below. 
9.1.3 We have attempted to estimate the costs of road accidents 
attributable to various vehicle axle categories by using the 
figures published annually in Basic Road Statistics (British Road 
Federation 1986), and the involvement rates for lorries (Armitage 
Report, Tables 34 and 35; and Road Accidents Great Britain 1985, 
Table 38). The total community cost of road accidents in 1984 
was estimated to be f2660mill (f2974mi11 at 1986 prices). 
Following the 1976 Consultation Document, we have taken one 
quarter (f743mill) as being chargeable. This was split over 
vehicle types in accordance with their accident involvement rates 
weighted by severity (ses .British Road Federation 1986). The 
result is to reduce the tax/cost radio of a 32t artic from 1.31 
to 1.26. See Table 8.1. It should be borne in mind that many 
accidents go unreported,so that official accident statistics, as 
used here, may be considerable underestimates. Also, the 
official values of accident costs have been raised by 50% since 
these figures were prepared, a further large increase in the 
value of fatalities has just been anounced. Thus these figures 
may represent a substantial underestimate. Moreover, if the 
accident rate rises more than proportionately with traffic 
volumes, or if the severity of the accident depends on traffic 
flow composition there is an additional externality to take into 
account (Newbery, 1987, p. 23) . 
10. Environmental Costs 
10.1.1 The Armitage Committee (Armitage, 1980) recommended that, 
because of the difficulty of measuring the environmental damage 
caused by lorries, the Chancellor of the Exchequer should cease 
the then current practice of overcharging light lorries, and 
should instead raise the amount of money involved from the 
heaviest lorries. This would create a 'margin1 of taxes over 
allocated costs for these vehicles, in recognition that they 
create more environmental problems. The Department's 1983 
proposals argued that 'to some extent road track costs already 
reflect social and environmental costs since roads expenditure, 
on which the costs are based, includes measures taken to deal 
with these problems1. Furthermore, they argued that 'stricter 
Government regulations on lorry noise and safety features direct 
some of the costs of dealing with social and environmental 
problems to their source: the lorry itself1. Nonetheless, the 
Department accepted Armitage's recommendation that there should 
be some margin between allocated costs and tax rates, 
particularly for the heaviest vehicles. They gave, and have 
subsequently given, no indication of how large they felt such a 
margin should be. 
10.1.2 We believe that techniques of environmental evaluation 
are insufficiently developed to give much guidence on this issue, 
and that ultimately the margin must be a matter of political 
judgement. In recent years, the margin has been held to roughly 
30%. 
10.1.3 Lorries may be considered to damage the environment in 
two ways. Firstly, by contributing to the case for more road 
space they cause some of the environmental costs of an expanded 
road infrastructure. These costs comprise the effects of land- 
take, visual intrusion and severance, and should be added to the 
financial costs of road construction. Secondly, they create 
environmental costs by their movement along the road. These costs 
consist of noise, vibration, air pollution and visual intrusion. 
10.1.4 A number of reports have attempted to place a value on 
traffic noise, mainly by reference to house prices (Roskill 1970, 
Llewellyn-Davies 1973). Lorries are generally noisier than other 
vehicles, and cause most nuisance at night when they form a 
larger proportion of a relatively small volume of traffic. 
10.1.5 To reduce this nui-siince, regulations have been ineroduced 
to progressively reduce the maximum noise emmissions from HGV1s. 
Thus the heaviest new lorries will be restricted to 84dB(A) from 
1989, and this limit is likely to be further reduced during the 
next decade. 
10.1.6 Generally large diesel engined lorries, in good working 
order, cause relatively little of the air pollution due to 
traffic. However, the black smoke produced by poorly maintained 
vehicles is unsightly and unpleasant. 
10.1.7 A particular category of cost which Armitage recommended 
should be included in the track costs calculations, and which is 
sometimes categorised as lenvironmental', is damage to 
underground services. The Department's 1983 consultation paper, 
however, took a different view of the evidence that Armitage 
presented. The result was that no estimation or allocation of 
these costs was made. There is a widespread feeling that the 
statutory undertakers have a good deal at present since they are 
not charged for delays caused to traffic when they need to access 
the underground services. Furthermore, it is no doubt the case 
that much of the damage to underground services would be avoided 
if the carefully designed road pavement were not weakened by 
access works. Nevertheless, as we are considering the 'marginal' 
cost of road use, it is clear that some damage would be avoided 
by the removal of all traffic or selected types of vehicle. Some 
value should therefore be included in the track costs 
calculations. Further research is needed to determine what an 
appropriate value might be. 
10.1.8 A wider issue of a similar nature is damage caused by 
vibration. Athough this can be viewed as a seperate sort of 
'noise', there is the difference that physical damage may result. 
Again there is very little hard evidence, particularly as damage 
may only manifest itself slowly over a long period and there may 
be a number of contributary 'causes'. It is understood that TRRL 
are undertaking further work on both information and damage to 
underground services. 
11. Conclusions 
11.1.1 The official position regarding taxes paid by lorries has 
changed from clearly not covering their track costs in 1975, to 
one of at least covering their direct track costs in 1986. This 
is partly the result of real changes but also due to major 
revisions in methodology which have taken place in the interim, 
nearly all favouring heavy lorries (see Table 11.1). 
................................................................. 
Table 11.1 
Chanses in Tax/Cost Ratios 
Vehicle Total tax (f) Tax/cost ratio 
class 1975/76 1975/76 1986/87 1975/76 1986/87 
at 1986 prices 
Rigid 
16t 858 1873 
24t 1403 3063 
30t 2137 4665 
Artic 
24t 1390. 3034 
32t 2065 4508 
Source:- i) The allocation of road track costs 1975/76, DTp. 
ii) The allocation of road track costs 1986/87, DTp. 
................................................................. 
11.1.2 We have argued that there are a number of deficiencies in 
the current calculations. Firstly, it appears that the tax paid 
by heavy goods vehicles is overstated. Secondly, for a number of 
reasons, the costs allocated to HGV8s may be an underestimate. 
Thirdly, it may be that the current level of spending is 
inadequate to maintain the standards of the road network in the 
long term. In any case, a true long run marginal cost pricing 
regime would relate capital expenditure to incremental traffic as 
described in Section 2. Fourthly, the current margin between 
allocated revenue and costs may be inadequate to allow fully for 
the external costs created by lorries, particularly those 
covering high mileages. As demonstated in the sensitivity tests, 
readjustment of the capital expenditure to 1975 levels would 
erode any excess of tax revenue over costs which exists at 
present. Restoring the present tax/cost margin would require a 
30% rise in taxes on heavy goods vehicles. Moving to a genuine 
long run marginal cost pricing regime, as described in Section 2, 
might require a further 25% tax increase on top of that. 
11.1.3 Despite this evidence of underpayment, there is currently 
strong pressure on the government to reduce the level of taxation 
on heavy goods vehicles, particularly in the interests of 
harmonisation of taxation within the European Community in 
preparation for the completion of the internal market in 1992 
(Cooper, Browne and Gretton, 1987). 
11.1.4 This may be one reason why the Chancellor has held 
taxation of HGV8s constant in money terms in recent budgets, thus 
leading to a real reduction. If harmonisation to a lower level 
of taxation is seen as inevitable, then it would be appropriate 
to relieve rail and water modes of a part of their infrastructure 
costs as a compensatory measure. Such an action is permitted 
under EC regulations, and indeed has already been implemented in 
France. It should not be seen as a subsidy to those modes as 
such, but rather as a correction to a distortion in another 
sector of the economy. 
.- . 
- 
11.1.5 Throughout this paper we have emphasised the lack of 
precise information behind many of the cost calculations.. We 
understand that further work on dynamic axle-loading is being 
undertaken by Dr Rhodes of Newcastle University. Other particular 
areas for further work are: 
(1) Further evidence and/or engineering advice might be sought 
on the extent to which pavement life is a function solely of 
standard axles, or is a mixture of standard axles and 
elapsed time. 
(2) Further research on appropriate pcu values for heavy lorries 
in a variety of circumstances (eg. on motorways) rather than 
solely at junctions appears needed. 
(3) The conflict between alternative sources on the cost savings 
to be achieved by building car-only roads needs to be 
resolved. 
(4) Up to date work on vehicle delay caused by heavy goods 
vehicles is needed. 
(5) Given advances in survey techniques, it may be worth a fresh 
attempt to place money values on the amenity costs of heavy 
goods vehicles. 
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